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PROPOSING STANDARDS FOR CHILD
CUSTODY: THE PROCEEDINGS, THE ROLE OF
THE AGENCY, AND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD
Joseph R. Carrieri*
Walter Murawski**
I. Introduction
Proceedings involving the care and custody of children are ob-
viously of great importance-to the natural parents, to the foster
parents, to society, and especially to the child. In recent years, both
the courts and the legislature have recognized that the child's inter-
est and well-being are of paramount importance in determining care
and custody, and the procedural and substantive advances made in
child custody cases have reflected this recognition.'
In order that effective consideration be given to the "best inter-
ests" of the child' there must be a thorough understanding of the
nature of child custody proceedings, the roles of the court and of the
parties, and the standards which the courts will apply in determin-
ing the custody of the child.
This Article will discuss each of these topics, and examine the
relevant sections of the New York Social Services Law' and recent
court decisions to provide an overview of present proceedings for the
placement of children in the custody of child-caring institutions.
For the purposes of this Article it will be assumed that an author-
ized child-caring agency4 has brought the proceeding.
* B.S. Fordham University; LL.B. Fordham University School of Law. Member of the New
York Bar. -Mr. Carrieri is a member of the firm of O'Brien, Carrieri & Lynch, Mineola, L.I.,
N.Y., and is author of the Practice Commentaries for McKinney's New York Social Services
Law.
** B.A. St. Anselm's College; M.S.S.S. St. John's Universsity; M.S.W. Adelphi Univer-
sity. Mr. Murawski is Supervisor of Foster Care in the Social Services Department at St.
Christopher's Home in Seacliff, N.Y., and is an adjunct instructor of Sociology at Molloy
College, N.Y.
1. See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 387 N.E.2d 821 356 N.Y.S.2d 277, (1976);
Carrieri, Development and Expansion of New York's Permanent Neglect Statute, 5 Fordham
Urb. L.J: 419 (1977).
2. N.Y. Soc. SEv. LAw §§ 384-b (1)(b), 392(7) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
3. Id. §§ 371-392.
4. "Authorized agency" means
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II. Child Custody Proceedings
The Social Services Law5 provides three methods whereby the
care of a "child" 6 may be entrusted to an authorized agency: (1) The
care of a child may be transferred temporarily to an authorized
agency by a parent, guardian or a person to whom a parent has
entrusted the care of the child. (The custody of a child may be
transferred only by a parent or guardian.)' (2) The guardianship and
custody of a destitute or dependent child under the age of eighteen
years may be committed to an authorized agency by a written and
signed instrument known as a surrender.' (3) The guardianship and
(a) Any agency, association, corporation, institution, society or other organization
which is incorporated or organized under the laws of this state with corporate power
or empowered by law to care for, to place out or to board out children, which actually
has its place of business or plant in this state and which is approved, visited, inspected
and supervised by the board [of Social Welfare] or which shall submit and. consent
to the approval, visitation, inspection and supervision of the board as to any and all
acts in relation to the welfare of children performed or to be performed under [Title I
(Care and protection of children) of article six of the Social Services Law]. (b) Any
court or any public welfare official of this state authorized by law to place out or to
board out children."
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 371 (10) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
5. Id. § 384 (Guardianship and custody of destitute or dependent children; commitment
by surrender instrument); § 384-a (Transfer of care and custody of children); § 384-b (Guardi-
anship and custody of distitute or dependent children; commitment by court order).
In addition to the provisions of the New York Social Service Law, the Family Court Act
provides additional methods whereby "the state, through its family court, may intervene
against the wishes of a parent on behalf of a child so that his needs are properly met." N.Y.
Fain. Ct. Act § 1011 (McKinney 1975).
6. Section 371(1) of the New York Social Service Law defines a child as "a person actually
or apparently under the age of sixteen years." For purposes of commitment to an authorized
agency or foster parent by court order under section 384-b or to an authorized agency by a
written surrender instrument under section 384, a child is a person under the age of eighteen
ybars. Id. §§ 384(1), 384-b(2).
7. Id. § 384-a(1). The care of a child involves supervision, nurturing, guidance and educa-
tion, together with the rendering of all services, including medical, which must be given to
aid the social, psychiatric and remedial development of the child.
8. Id. Custody is the legal guardianship of a child. One entrusted with the custody of a
child need not provide care for the child but must see that the child receives such care from
whomever has assumed care.
9. Id. 384(1). This is a voluntary surrender which terminates parental rights for purposes
of freeing the child for adoption. Id.
The surrender instrument must be signed by both parents, if living, or a surviving parent;
or, if either parent has abandoned the child for the immediately preceding six months, then
by the other parent; or, if the child is born out of wedlock, then by the mother of the child;
or, if both parents are dead, or the mother of the child born out of wedlock is dead, then by
the child's guardian, provided court approval is given and recorded. Id. § 3S4(1)(a)-(d).
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custody of a destitute or dependent child may be committed to an
authorized agency or authorized foster parent 0 by order of a surro-
gate or judge of the family court," upon a proceeding brought by
either the agency or the foster parent. 2 An order committing the
guardianship and custody of a child under this section may be
granted only upon one or more of the following grounds: 3 (a) Both
parents are dead and no guardian has been appointed; (b) the par-
The surrender instrument can, and usually does, provide that no action may be brought
by the surrendering parent, either for the custody of the child or for the annulment of the
proceeding, once the child has been placed with adoptive parents and more than thirty days
has elapsed since the execution of the surrender. An action may be brought, however, on the
ground of fraud, duress, or coercion in the execution. See, In re Nicky, 81 Misc. 2d 132, 364
N.Y.S.2d 970 (Surr. Ct. 1975). If thirty days have not elapsed since the execution of the
surrender instrument, or the child is not in an adoptive home, the court may order the return
of the child to the surrendering parent despite the existence of the surrender instrument, upon
a finding that the parent is fit and that it would be in the best interest of the child to be
returned. See, e.g., People ex rel. Anonymous v. Saratoga County Dep't of Public Works, 30
App. Div. 2d 756, 291 N.Y.S.2d 526 (3d Dep't 1968); In re Handler, 6 App. Div. 2d 977, 176
N.Y.S.2d 689 (3d Dep't 1958). In In re Ruth J., 55 App. Div. 2d 52, 389 N.Y.S.2d 473 (3d
Dep't 1976), the court returned the child to her mother, who had signed a surrender instru-
ment in the good faith belief that the child would be returned to her when she gave notice in
writing, since there was no proof that the mother was either an unfit parent, or that she had
neglected the child.
In any event, a consummated adoption is unassailable. McGaffin v. Family and Children's
Service of Albany, 6 Misc. 2d 776, 164 N.Y.S.2d 444 (Sup. Ct. 1957), aff'd, 7 App. Div. 2d
769, 179 N.Y.S.2d 948 (3d Dep't 1958).
10. An authorized foster parent within the meaning of section 384-b is one who may
institute a proceeding under that section pursuant to section 392 of the Social Services Law
(Foster care status; periodic family court review) or section 1055 of the Family Court Act
(Placement). N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 384-b(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
11. Id.:
Where such guardianship and custody is committed to a foster parent, the family court
or surrogate's court shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the parties and the child
and may, upon its own motion or the motion of any party, revoke, modify or extend
its order, if the foster parent fails to institute a proceeding for the adoption of the child
within six months after the entry of the order committing the guardianship and cus-
tody of the child to such foster parent.
12. Id. § 384(3)(b). A section 384-b proceeding is not only a means whereby an authorized
agency initially acquires care and custofy of a child. An agency can institute a section 384-b
proceeding even after it has acquired care of the child (e.g., through a section 384-a transfer
of care, or through an article ten abuse and neglect proceeding).
13. Id. § 384-b(4)(a).(d).
An order committing the guardianship and custody of a child pursuant to [section 384-
b] shall be granted only upon a finding that one or more of the grounds specified in
paragraphs (a), (b) or (d) of subdivision four are based upon a fair preponderance of
the evidence, or upon a finding that one or more of the grounds specified in paragraph
(c) of subdivision four are based upon clear and convincing proof.
Id. § 384-b(3)(g).
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ent or parents whose consent to any adoption is required has aban-
doned the child for the six months immediately prior to the proceed-
ings; (c) the parent or parents whose consent to any adoption is
required "are presently and for the foreseeable future unable, by
reason of mental illness or mental retardation, to provide proper and
adequate care for a child who has been in the care of an authorized
agency for the period of one year immediately prior to the initiation
of the proceeding;" or (d) the child is a permanently neglected
child.'
The first obligation of a child-care agency to a child in its care or
the care of a foster parent is to make diligent efforts to strengthen
and encourage the parental relationship. 5 "The expressed policy of
the law is to seek the earliest possible return of a child to his natural
parents in his best interest, and the agency is mandated to assist in
achieving this goal."'" When this objective cannot be achieved and
foster care must be continued, the legislature has provided proce-
dures to reduce unnecessarily protracted stays in foster care, to
assure that the rights of the natural parents are protected, and to
further the best interests, needs, and rights of the child. 7
The New York Court of Appeals has recognized the obligation of
the state agencies to both parent and child, and has expanded the
"best interest" criteria by, in effect, extending the statutory provi-
sions to determine "the most desirable alternative"'" for each child.
14. A "permanently neglected child" is one in the care of an authorized agency whose
parent or custodian has failed during a one-year period following the child's commitment to
such agency's care "substantially and continuously or repeatedly to maintain contact with
or plan for the future of the child, although physically and financially able to do so, notwith-
standing the agency's diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship
when such efforts will not be detrimental to the best interests of the child." Id. § 384-b(7)(a).
For a fuller discussion of New York's Permanent Neglect Statute as a means of terminating
the custodial rights of natural parents in order to free children for adoption, see Carrieri,
Development and Expansion of New York's Permanent Neglect Statute, 5 Fordham Urban
L.J. 419 (1977).
The constitutionality of New York's permanent neglect statute recently has been upheld.
In re Carl and Annette N., 91 Misc. 2d 738, 398 N.Y.S.2d 613 (Fain. Ct. 1977).
15. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
16. In re Lamond B., N.Y.L.J., August 26, 1977, p. 14, col. 3 (Fam. Ct. 1977).
17. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
18. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 552, 356 N.E.2d 277, 285, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 828-
29 (1976).
In In re Patricia Ann W, 89 Misc. 2d 368, 376, 392 N.Y.S.2d 180, 185 (Fam. Ct. 1977), Judge
Stanley Gartenstein pointed out the probable result of Bennett's "sweeping language, which
had the practical effect of obliterating statutory categorization, and in the process, the appli-
[Vol. VI
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[I]ntervention by the State in the right and responsibility of a natural
parent to custody of her or his child is warranted if there is first a judicial
finding of surrender, abandonment, unfitness, persistent neglect, unfortun-
ate or involuntary extended disruption of custody, or other equivalent but
rare extraordinary circumstance which would drastically affect the welfare
of the child. It is only on such a premise that the courts may then proceed to
inquire into the best interest of the child and to order a custodial disposition
on that ground. 9
Child custody proceedings may be brought by any authorized
agency or foster parent in a court of competent jurisdiction,0 and
usually involve the following cases:
(1) Foster Care Review Proceedings
(2) Abuse and Neglect Proceedings
(3) Extension of Placement Proceedings
(4) Abandonment Proceedings
(5) Permanent Neglect Proceedings
(6) Habeas Corpus Proceedings
A. Foster Care Review Proceedings ("392 Hearings")
Prior to the enactment of section 392 of the New York Social
Services Law in 1971,21 there was no court review of the status of
children in foster care. Because of the lack of court review, many
children who should have been adopted or returned home to their
natural parents, needlessly remained in foster care.2"
cation of many prior holdings." Noting that Bennett "finally recognized the best interests
criteria and the psychological parent school of thought as the overwhelming and perhaps, in
practical application the only factor in deciding any case in which the future of the child is
at stake, Judge Gartenstein stated:
It is possible to read into this, and one Appellate Court has apparently done so,
judicial intent that regardless of whether or not statutory grounds for certain actions
involving a child's future are present, the existence of a psychological parent, or as
phrased the "best interest" of that child, would mandate certain judicial action on
behalf of the child.
Applying this analysis in Patricia Ann, the court interpreted the Bennett test to apply to
the fact-finding hearing in a permanent neglect proceeding. See text accompanying notes 132-
33 infra.
19. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 549, 356 N.E.2d 277, 283, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 827
(1976).
20. See the appropriate subsections of this Article for the specific court and county having
jurisdiction.
21. 1971 N.Y. Laws, ch. 97 (McKinney 1971). The statutory procedure for foster care
review proceedings has been held constitutional. Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
22. If the purpose of section 392, adopted in 1971, was to alleviate these inequities then
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Section 392 provides that when a child has been in foster care for
a continuous period of eighteen months,2 the authorized agency
must file a petition seeking review of the child's status.2' The peti-
tion is filed in the family court of the county in which the agency
has its principal office, or where the child resides.25 The petition
must set forth the disposition sought (return of the child to his
natural parents, continuation of foster care, initiation of proceed-
ings to free the child for adoption, etc.), and the reasons such a
disposition is sought." Thereafter, all interested parties are given
notice of the review hearing, a copy of the petition and a statement
of the dispositional alternatives.Y
1. The Hearing
The purpose of the family court hearing is to review the foster care
it is doubtful It has served its purpose. Consider, for example, the findings of the 1976 New
York State Legislature in adopting section 384-b of the Social Service Law:
The Legislature further finds that many children who have been placed in foster care
experience unnecessarily protracted stays in such care without being adopted or re-
turned to their parents or other custodians. Such unnecessary stays may deprive these
children of positive, nurturing family relationships and have deleterious effects on their
development into responsible, productive citizens .... [Pirovision of a timely proce-
dure for the termination, in appropriate cases, of the rights of the natural parents could
reduce such necessary stays.
1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 666, § 1(b) (McKinney 1976).
23. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 392(2) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
In an apparent attempt to limit possible subterfuge in avoiding the requirements of a 392
hearing, and in any event to prevent unfair extension of the review period, the section pro-
vides that should foster care be discontinued, and within three months thereafter the child
again is placed under the care of an authorized agency, "the period during which the child
was not in foster care shall not constitute an interruption of continuous foster care for the
[sole] purpose of review under this section." Id.
24. Id. The petition, together with a copy of the placement instrument, may be filed by
the authorized agency charged with the care and custody or the guardianship and custody of
the child; by another authorized agency that has supervision of the foster care; or by the foster
parent or parents in whose home the child resides or has resided during the eighteen month
period. Id. § 392(2)(a)-(c).
25. Id. § 392(3)(a).
26. Id. § 392(3)(b).
27. Id. § 392(4). The following are interested parties entitled to participate in the proceed-
ing: the authorized agency charged with the care and custody or guardianship and custody
of the child; the authorized agency having supervision of the foster care; the foster parent or
parents in whose home the child resided or resides at or after the expiration of the eighteen
month period; the child's parent or guardian who transferred the care and custody of the child
temporarily to an authorized agency; a person to whom the parent entrusted the care of the
child, who later transferred the care of the child to an authorized agency; any other person
as the court, in its discretion, may direct. Id.
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status of the child to aid the court in its order of disposition.18 At
the initial hearing, each party is informed of the right to have an
attorney. If the party cannot afford an attorney, one will be ap-
pointed without charge from the "18-b Panel." 9 In a contested mat-
ter the court also will appoint an attorney as Law Guardian of the
child to protect the child's interest °.3  If the proceeding is uncon-
tested, there is usually no need to appcint attorneys, and the hear-
ing is usually informal and held immediately. For example, if the
plan of the agency is to return the child to the parent in the near
future, and the foster parents neither wish to adopt the child nor
otherwise oppose the return, the court after hearing the parties may
direct that foster care continue, and set a date for returning the
child to his natural parents. On the other hand, if the agency is
seeking to have the child freed for adoption, and the natural parents
are opposed, the court will -then appoint necessary attorneys, and
adjourn the matter until a so-called "long hearing ' 31 is scheduled.
Prior to the secheduled hearing the court may order a psychological
examination of the parents and the child by the Bureau of Mental
Hygiene.
At the hearing, the court must consider the following factors in
making its determination: 3
(1) the appropriateness of the plan proposed by the authorized
agency;
(2) the services which have been offered by the agency to
strengthen and reunite the family;
(3) when return home of the child is not likely, the efforts which
were made or should have been made to evaluate or plan for other
modes of care; and
28. Id. § 392. Upon periodic family court review of foster care status, the natural parent
is entitled to a plenary and evidentiary hearing. In re Denlow, 87 Misc. 2d 410, 412, 384
N.Y.S.2d 621, 625 (Fam. Ct. 1976). However, the court, with the consent of the parties, may
dispense with the hearing and make a determination based upon the papers submitted to the
court. Id. § 392(6). In any event, the court, in its discretion, may dispense with the attendance
of the child at the hearing. Id.
29. N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722 [art. 18-b] (McKinney Supp. 1977) provides for the creation
of a panel consisting of qualified attorneys to provide voluntary representation of persons
accused of crimes and parties before the family court. The Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court assigns counsel from the panel on a rotating basis for indigent natural parents and
foster parents, and Law Guardians for foster children.
30. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §§ 241-249 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
31. A "long hearing" is a colloquialism for a hearing expected to last more than two hours.
32. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 392 (5-a)(a)-(d) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
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(4) any other efforts which have been or will be made to promote
the best interests of the child.
In order to have the child freed for adoption, the agency must
show, through the testimony of its caseworkers and by the case
records, that the child is, in effect, permanently neglected .3  The
usual method of proof is production by the agency of a written
progress report outlining the basic facts, the status of the case, the
agency's recommendations and the basis for the recommendations."
This report should outline all affirmative acts on the part of the
agency to strengthen parental ties with the child, including but not
limited to:
(1) encouraging visits by the parent, and when necessary, bring-
ing the child to the parents for a home visit;
(2) aiding the parent to obtain satisfactory housing, a job or
public assistance;
(3) assisting the parent in obtaining needed medical assistance;
(4) counselling the foster parents and enlisting their aid in
strengthening the ties between the child and his natural parents;
(5) counselling the child to accept a parent who for whatever
reason is no longer a parental figure to the child.
In opposing the agency position, the natural parent will attempt
to show that the parent did visit and plan for the child, or if the
parent did not, that he or she was physically or financially unable
to do so, or that the agency did not use its best efforts to strengthen
the parental ties. In most cases, the foster parents appear in support
of the agency position, and the child is also present. If the child is
old enough, the court will obtain permission of the attorneys to
33. For the purposes of a foster care review hearing the standard employed in determining
whether a child is permanently neglected is that promulgated by section 384-b(7)(a) of the
New York Social Services Law:
[A] "permanently neglected child" shall mean a child [i.e., a person under the age
of eighteen years, N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1977)] who is in
the care of an authorized agency and whose parent or custodian has failed for a period
of more than one year following the date such child came into the care of an authorized
agency substantially and continuously or repeatedly to maintain contact with or plan
for the future of the child, although physically and financially able to do so, notwith-
standing the agency's diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental rela-
tionship when such efforts will not be detrimental to the best interests of the child.
34. This report will be offered and received in evidence and will permit the judge to
ascertain the agency's position. It therefore forms part of the record. The written report
prepared in advance is usually well-developed and may be more reliable than oral testimony
in a situation where the court is faced with a long calendar and is short on time.
[Vol. VI
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interview the child in chambers. Some judges prefer to have the Law
Guardian present during the interview, and permit him to ask ques-
tions of the child.35 The results of any court-ordered psychological
examinations of the parents are also entered into the record during
the hearing.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court makes an immediate
order of disposition in accordance with the best interests of the child
as shown by the evidence produced at the hearing. 6 The disposition
order must do one of the following:
(1) direct that foster care of the child be continued because it
would not be in the best interests of the child to be returned home
to his parents;37
(2) in the case of a child who has been committed temporarily
to the care of an authorized agency by a parent, guardian, or rela-
tive, direct that the child be returned to such parent, guardian or
relative;"
(3) in the case of a child who has been committed temporarily
to the care of an unauthorized agency by a parent, guardian, or
relative, direct that the agency institute a proceeding to free the
child for adoption;
39
(4) in the case of a child whose guardianship and custody have
been committed to an authorized agency by court order or a surren-
der instrument, direct that the child be placed for adoption in the
foster family home where he resides or has resided, or with any other
designated person or persons."
The court retains continuing jurisdiction after handing down its
order of disposition, and must rehear the matter "whenever it deems
35. "The court may, in its discretion, dispense with the attendance of the child at the
hearing ...." N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 392 (6) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
36. Id. § 392(7). The order of disposition must include findings in support of the court's
determination that the disposition is in the child's best interests. Gaskin v. Harlem Dowling
Children's Services, 54 App. Div. 2d 641, 387 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1st Dep't 1976). "If the court
promulgates separate findings of fact or conclusions of law, or an opinion in lieu thereof, the
order of disposition may incorporate such findings and conclusions, or opinions, by refer-
ence." N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 392(7) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
37. Id. § 392(7)(a).
38. Id. § 392(7)(b).
39. Id. § 392(7)(c).
40. Id. § 392(7)(d). The court on its own motion may substitute the foster parents for the
agency in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, when the agency which had commenced
the proceeding at the direction of family court failed to pursue it. In re Lisa M., 87 Misc. 2d
826, 387 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Fam. Ct. 1976).
19781
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
necessary or desirable, or upon petition by any party .... but at
least every twenty-four months."4'
B. Abuse And Neglect Proceedings
When parents threaten a child's physical, mental and emotional
well-being by injury or mistreatment of the child, the state may
intervene against the parents' wishes on behalf of the child.2 Article
Ten of the New York Family Court Act43 establishes a procedure to
meet the needs of the abused or neglected child. The family court
of the county in which the child or his custodian resides or is domi-
ciled has exclusive original jurisdiction over the proceedings."
Essentially, an abused child is one less than sixteen years of age
upon whom his parents inflict or permit the inflicting of physical
injury. A neglected child is one under eighteen years of age who has
been abandoned by his parents or whose physical, mental, or emo-
tional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of
becoming impaired as a result of his parents' failure to exercise a
minimum degree of care in supplying either food, clothing, shelter,
or education."
In an article ten proceeding, the issue is not whether parental
rights to the child will be terminated permanently, thereby releas-
ing the child for adoption, but whether the child has been abused
or neglected, and if so, whether the child should be returned to the
home or placed with an authorized agency or other person. The
proceeding is therefore divided into two hearings: the fact-finding
hearing and the dispositional hearing.
1. The Fact-finding Hearing
A proceeding under article ten is initiated by filing a petition
which alleges facts sufficient to establish that a child has been
41. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 392(10).
42. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 1011 (McKinney 1975).
43. Id. §§ 1011-1074.
44. Id. §§ 1013, 1015.
45. Id. § 1012(e). Examples of abuse are the inflicting of serious physical injury other than
by accident, and criminal sex offenses committed against the child.
46. Id. § 1012(f). Examples of neglect are leaving a small child at home alone, or on the
streets unguarded or unattended: the use of alcohol or drugs by the parent to such an extent
that he loses self-control; the inflicting of excessive corporal punishment; or any other acts
of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court.
[Vol. VI
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abused or neglected. 7 When the petition alleges abuse, the court
issues a summons, together with a copy of the petition, requiring the
appearance within three court days of the child's parents, or other
person legally responsible for the child's care or with whom he is
residing.4" When the petition alleges neglect only, the summons and
petition issued to the child's parents or person legally responsible
for the child's care will designate a time and place for the court
appearance (which need not be within three court days of service).4"
In either case, the court may also require the person summoned to
produce the child at the time and place named.50
At the fact-finding hearing, the court is concerned only with the
alleged abuse or neglect of the child. Testimony is taken and evi-
dence submitted solely on that issue, and the court's sole determi-
nation is whether or not the child is abused or neglected."
2. The Dispositional Hearing52
Based on its findings of fact the court determines if the child
should be returned to the parent or placed with the Commissioner
of Social Services, an authorized agency, or some other suitable
person. The dispositional hearing usually commences immediately
after the court makes its required findings of fact.53 The court will
consider evidence" with respect to the parents' rehabilitation, their
47. Id. § 1031.
The following may originate a proceeding under this article:
(a) a child protective agency, or
(b) a person on the court's direction.
Id. § 1032.
48. Id. § 1035(a). The petition and summons must be served within two days of their
issuance, and at least twenty-four hours before the time stated thereon for appearance. Id. §
1036. The summons must be marked clearly on its face, "Child Abuse Case". Id. § 1035(a).
49. Id. § 1035(b).
50. Id. § 1035(a), (b). In abuse cases, the court must direct that the child be brought
before the court, unless dispensed with for good cause shown. Id. § 1036.
51. Id. § 1044. Any determination that the child is abused or neglected must be based on
a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 1046(b).
52. Id. § 1045.
53. Id. § 1047(a). After the fact-finding hearing, the court may adjourn the proceedings
to enable it to inquire into the surroundings, conditions and capacities of the person involved.
Id. § 1048(b).
54. Any reports prepared for the court's use are deemed confidential, and the court, in
its discretion, may withhold any or all of the information contained in the reports from the
Law Guardian, counsel, party in interest or any other person. These reports may not be
furnished to the court before the completion of the fact-finding hearing-they are to be used
only at the dispositional hearing. Id. § 1047(b).
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living conditions, and the feelings and wishes of the child, if the
child is old enough to articulate these.55 Medical and psychological
reports may also be considered.
At the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, the court enters an
"order of disposition", which may:5"
(1) suspend judgment for a period of one year,57
(2) release the child to the custody of his parents or the person
legally responsible for the child's care;5"
(3) place the child for an initial period of eighteen months in the
custody of a relative or other suitable person, the Commissioner of
Social Services, or an authorized agency suitable for child place-
ment;5"
(4) issue an order of protection setting forth reasonable condi-
tions of behavior to be observed for a specified time by the parent
or person legally responsible for the child's care;60
(5) place the parent under supervision of a child protective
agency or authorized agency for a period up to eighteen months.,
C. Extension Of Placement Proceedings
Eighteen months after the court places a child with the Commis-
sioner of Social Services or an authorized agency following an abuse
or neglect proceeding, the agency must file a petition for extension
of placement.2 Otherwise, the court loses jurisdiction, and the par-
ent may assume full control and custody of the child. 3 No place-
ment may be extended or continued unless a hearing is held con-
cerning the need for extending or continuing the placement. 4 At the
hearing, the agency must show that the parent is not a fit parent to
receive the child, and that it would be in the best interests of the
child to remain in placement. 5 The agency, usually through the
55. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 348-b(k) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
56. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1052(a). The court must state the grounds for any disposition
ordered. Id. § 1052(b).
57. Id. § 1053(b).
58. Id. § 1054.
59. Id. § 1055(a), (b).
60. Id. § 1056.
61. Id. § 1057.
62. Id. § 1055(b)(ii).
63. Id. § 1055(b)(i).
64. Id. § 1055(b)(ii).
65. Id. § 1055.
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testimony of the caseworker assigned to the case, must submit evi-
dence on the lack of meaningful parental visitation during the ini-
tial eighteen month period; the caseworker's visits to the parental
home and observations of the living conditions or any familial prob-
lems; and the agency efforts to ameliorate any problems which
stand in the way of the return of the child to the parents.6
The child's natural parents, any other person responsible for the
child's care, and the foster parents also are entitled to participate
in the placement extension proceeding, and may submit evidence
and examine the agency's witnesses. 7
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court issues an order either
extending or terminating the placement. An extension of placement
may be for no longer than one year, after which another review
proceeding is required."
In addition to an order of extension, or in lieu of it, the court may
order the agency to "undertake diligent efforts to encourage and
strengthen the parental relationship when it finds such efforts will
not be detrimental to the best interests of the child." 9 The court
may order also that the agency initiate proceedings to free the child
for adoption.7
D. Abandonment Proceedings
A child is deemed abandoned by his parent if the child is under
eighteen years of age, and his parent "evinces an intent to forego his
or her parental rights and obligations as manifested by his or her
failure to visit the child and communicate with the child or agency,
although able to do so and not prevented or discouraged from doing
so by the agency."'"
Determination of a child's abandoned status is made solely on the
basis of the parent's conduct toward the child and the agency. It is
not encumbent upon the agency to encourage and stengthen the
66. Id.
67. Id. § 1055(b)(ii).
68. Id. § 1055(b)(i).
69. Id. § 1055(c). The order of the court may include a "specific plan of action" and
may require the agency to assist the parent or other person responsible for the child's care in
obtaining adequate housing, employment, counseling, medical care or psychiatric treat-
ment." Id.
70. Id. §§ 1055(d).
71. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 371(2), 384-b(5) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
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parent's interest in the child in the absence of the parent's own
acts-the only obligation of the agency is to refrain from preventing
or discouraging such action."2
The burden of proof to show that the parent abandoned the child
without good reason is on the agency.73 Through the testimony of the
assigned caseworker, the agency usually presents evidence as to the
lack of parental contact. The caseworker will testify to conversa-
tions with the parents, and recount his professional observations
concerning the parents and their residence. He also will testify that
the parents did not: (1) visit the child; (2) support the child; (3)
send the child letters, cards or presents; or (4) contact the agency
to inquire about the child for at least the six months prior to the
filing of the petition for an abandonment hearing by the agency.
Although no longer necessary in abandonment proceedings," the
caseworker may also testify about agency attempts to help reunite
the parent and the child. The caseworker may point out, for exam-
ple, that the parent was encouraged to visit, and if visiting was
difficult, that the agency provided money for transportation or of-
fered to bring the child to the parent's home.
The child's foster parents, if any, also are entitled to participate
in the hearing. They usually appear in support of the agency peti-
tion to show that the child generally is receiving good care, and that
the child's best interests are served by his remaining in foster care.
On the other hand, the natural parents, by their attorney, will at-
72. In making its determination, "the court shall not require a showing of diligent efforts,
if any, by an authorized agency to encourage the parent to perform the acts specified .... "
Id. § 382-b(5)(b). See also, In re Anonymous, 40 N.Y.2d 96, 351 N.E.2d 707, 386 N.Y.S.2d 59
(1976), which held that an authorized agency need not allege nor prove that it used diligent
efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship when it attempts to gain legal
custody of the child based upon abandonment under a section 384 proceeding.
73. However, this burden is met by a mere showing that the parent failed to visit the child
or communicate with the agency although able to do so. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the ability of the parent to do so is presumed. Id. § 382-b(5)(a). But, compare, In
re Amy S., 89 Misc. 2d 42, 390 N.Y.S.2d 530 (Fam. Ct. 1976). In Amy S., the court held that,
under the principles announced in Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387
N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976), a parent could lose legal custody of a child through an abandonment
proceeding when the child has been separated from the parent for a lengthy period, and it
was in the best interest of the child to remain with the psychological parent. The court then
concluded, "By inference, therefore, the requirement of finding omission to act without good
reason contained in section 371 (subd. 2,, par [c]) [of the Social Service Law] may be
rendered inoperative." 89 Misc. 2d at 49, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 535-36.
74. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
[Vol. VI
STANDARDS FOR CHILD CUSTODY
tempt to show that (1) there were parental visits, or some contact
such as cards, letters, or telephone calls, or a relative kept in touch
with the child; (2) the parent was physically unable to visit the
child; (3) the agency favored the foster parents over the natural
parents; (4) the foster parents undermined the child's relationship
with his natural parents; (5) the natural parents were on welfare and
could not give the child adequate financial support.
When the child is over fourteen years of age, the court also may
consider the wishes of the child in determining his best interests.7"
If the court is satisfied by a fair preponderance of the evidence"
that the child has been abandoned, it will sustain the petition and
issue an order of commitment. The order of commitment gives the
guardianship and legal custody of the child to the authorized
agency, with the power to consent to an adoption without further
notice to or consent of the natural parent, subject to court ap-
proval.77
E. Permanent Neglect Proceedings
If a court determines that a child has been permanently neglected
by his parent, it may commit the guardianship and custody of the
child to an authorized agency or foster parent.
A permanently neglected child is defined as: a child who is in the care of
an authorized agency and whose parent or custodian has failed for a period
of more than one year following the date such child came into the care of an
authorized agency substantially and continuously or repeatedly to maintain
contact with or plan for the future of the child, although physically and
financially able to do so, notwithstanding the agency's diligent efforts to
encourage and strengthen the parental relationship when such efforts will not
be detrimental to the best interests of the child."
75. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 382-b(3)(k) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
76. Id. § 382-b(3)(g).
77. Id. § 382-b(3)(e).
If successful, the attorney for the agency will draft a proposed Order with Notice of Settle-
ment, and serve it on the attorney for the parent, giving two days notice (three days if it is
served by mail). After the order is signed, the Order with Notice of Entry is served on the
parent's attorney to start the time to appeal running. After receipt of the Order with Notice
of Entry, the parents have thirty days within which to appeal the Order of Commitment.
78. Id. § 384-b(7). For a discussion of the proceedings involving permanently neglected
children in New York see Carrieri, Development and Expansion of New York's Permanent
Neglect Statue, 5 Fordham Urb. L.J. 419 (1977).
79. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1977). Section 384-b(7) also
provides:
19781
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
Only the Family Court has jurisdiction over permanent neglect
proceedings. 0 Venue is in the county in which the child or the par-
ent of the child resides or is domiciled, or in which the authorized
agency has an office for the regular conduct of business.5 '
The proceeding to permanently terminate the parents' custody of
the child on-the ground of permanent neglect is originated by peti-
tion, which must allege that:
(1) the child is under eighteen years of age;
(b) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of this subdivision, evidence of insubstantial
or infrequent contacts by a parent with his or her child shall not, of itself, be sufficient
as a matter of law to preclude a determination that such child is a permanently
neglected child. A visit or communication by a parent with the child which is of such
character as to overtly demonstrate a lack of affectionate and concerned parenthood
shall not be deemed a substantial contact.
(c) As used in paragraph (a) of this subdivision, "to plan for the future of the child"
shall mean to take such steps as may be necessary to provide an adequate, stable home
and parental care for the child within a period of time which is reasonable under the
financial circumstances available to the parent. The plan must be realistic and feasi-
ble, and good faith effort shall not, of itself, be determinative. In determining whether
a parent has planned for the future of the child, the court may consider the failure of
the parent to utilize medical, psychiatric, psychological and other social and rehabili-
tative services and material resources made available to such parent.
(d) For the purposes of this subdivision:
(i) A parent shall not be deemed unable to maintain contact with or plan for the
future of the child by reason of such parent's use of drugs or alcohol, except while the
parent is actually hospitalized or institutionalized therefor;
(ii) A parent shall be deemed unable to maintain contact with or plan for the future
of the child while he is actually incarcerated; and
(iii) The time during which a parent is actually hospitalized, institutionalized, or
incarcerated shall not interrupt, but shall not be part of, a period of failure to maintain
contact with or plan for the future of a child.
(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subdivision, evidence
of diligent efforts by an agency to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship
shall not be required when the parent has failed for a period of six months to keep the
agency apprised of his or her location.
(f) As used in this subdivision, "diligent efforts" shall mean reasonable attempts
by an authorized agency to assist, develop and encourage a meaningful relationship
between the parent and child, including but not limited to:
(1) consultation and corporation with the parents in developing a plan for appro-
priate services to the child and his family;
(2) making suitable arrangements for the parents to visit the child;
(3) provision of services and other assistance to the parents so that problems pre-
venting the discharge of the child from care may be resolved or ameliorated; and
(4) informing the parents at appropriate intervals of the child's progress, develop-
ment and health.
80. Id. § 384-b(3)(d).
81. Id. § 384-b(3)(c).
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(2) the child is in the care of an authorized agency;
(3) the agency.-has made diligent efforts to encourage and
strengthen the parental relationship, specifying the efforts made or
averring that such efforts would be detrimental to the best interests
of the child, and giving the reasons for that assertion;
(4) the natural parent, although physically and financially able
to do so, did not maintain contact with the child during the one year
period following the child's placement with the agency, despite the
diligent efforts by the agency to foster a relationship between the
child and the natural parent; .and
(5) it is in the child's best interest that custody of the child be
committed to an authorized agency or foster family.2
As in the case of abuse and neglect proceedings, 3 an inquiry into
the parents' permanent neglect of a child is divided into two hear-
ings: the fact-finding hearing 4 and the dispositional hearing."'
1. The fact-finding hearing
Upon timely service of the summons and petition upon the parent
or person legally responsible for the care of the child, 8 a hearing on
the petition is held in the family court.8 7 The agency must support
the allegations in the petition by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence,"' and "[o]nly competent, material and relevant evidence
may be admitted" in support of the'agency position." The fact-
finding hearing proceeds on the basis of the allegations contained
in the petition; and the agency must prove each of the five elements
enumerated in the statute to meet its burden'of proof.'"
In essence, the court must determine whether the agency and the
82. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 614(1) (McKinney Supp. 1977). "Where the petitioner is not the
authorized agency, allegations relating to the efforts of the authorized agency may be made
upon information and belief." Id. § 614(2).
83. See text accompanying notes 43-62 supra.'
84. A fact-finding hearing is a hearing to determine whether the allegations in the petition
are supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 622 (McKinney
Supp. 1977).
85. A dispositional.hearing is a hearing to determine what order of disposition should be
made in accordance with' the best' interists of the-child. Id. § 623.
86. Id. § 617.
87. See text accompanying notes 80-81 supra.
88. N.Y. FAM. CT. AT § 622 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
89. Id. § 624.
90. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
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natural parents have discharged their respective duties, namely
(1) the agency obligation to use diligent efforts to strengthen par-
ental ties;9 and (2) the parental obligation "substantially and con-
tinuously ... to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the
child.'"'
If the court is satisfied that the natural parent has permanently
neglected the child despite the diligent efforts of the agency, it will
sustain the petition and order a dispositional hearing to determine
whether the interests of the child require that the parents' custody
be terminated permanantly.9 3
2. The dispositional hearing
Upon completion of the fact-finding hearing the dispositional
hearing may commence immediately.94 Its sole purpose is to deter-
mine whether the child's best interests will be served by perma-
nently terminating parental custody, and thus any order purporting
to terminate custody entered before the dispositional hearing will be
reversed as premature.95
At the hearing, the court may consider testimony of the agency,
the foster parents, and the natural parents, and accept medical,
psychological or other reports prepared by the probation service or
the agency."
91. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(f) (McKinney 1971); see also note 79 supra.
92. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
93. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 625(a) (McKinney Supp. 1977). ". . . [ilf all parties consent
the court may ... dispose with the dispositional hearing and make an order of disposition on
the basis of competent evidence admitted at the fact-finding hearing." Id.
94. Id.
95. In re Lewis, 41 App. Div. 2d 619, 340 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1st Dep't 1973). In Lewis a
proceeding to terminate custody of an allegedly permanently neglected child was brought by
the school in which the child had been placed. The family court then entered an order
purporting to terminate permanently custody by the natural parent. The evidence at the fact-
finding hearing amply justified the finding of permanent neglect, according to the appellate
division; however, the court struck from the order the paragraph terminating custody and
remanded the proceeding for a dispositional hearing, holding that permanent termination of
custody was premature. Although the family court order provided for a future dispositional
hearing, the disposition itself was made in that very order, and the appellate court held this
may not be done until the conclusion of a dispositional hearing to determine the child's best
interests. Thus, while accepting the factual finding of permanent neglect, the court neverthe-
less remanded for proper completion of the proceedings.
96. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 625(b) (McKinney Supp. 1977). These reports are deemed confi-
dential information which the court, in its discretion, may "withhold from or disclose in whole
or in part to the Law Guardian, counsel, party in interest, or other appropriate person." Id.
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At the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, the court may enter
an order:97
(1) dismissing the petition;9"
(2) suspending judgment for a period not to exceed one year; 9
or
(3) permanently terminating custody of the parent and award-
ing custody to the authorized agency.'""
The order of disposition must be made solely on the basis of the
best interest of the child,'0 ' and there is no presumption that this
interest will be promoted by any particular disposition. 0
F. Habeas Corpus Proceedings
Whenever there is a dispute over the custody of a child, the party
seeking custody may institute a habeas corpus proceeding seeking
court determination of the custody issue. 03 For example, if a child
has been placed in foster care with foster parents, and the foster
parents refuse the agency request that the child be returned either
to it or to the natural parents, the agency or natural parents may
petition the court to order the production of the child and litigation
of the child's cutody.
In such a situation, the court proceeding is grounded on the prem-
ise that the natural parent has the right to custody superior to all
others in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. 04 This princi-
ple was enunciated in the landmark decision of the New York State
Court of Appeals, Bennett v. Jeffreys,0 which held that a mother's
The reports may not be submitted to the court during the fact-finding hearings, their use is
restricted to the dispositional hearing and the dispositional order. Id.
97. Id. § 631.
98. Id. § 632.
99. Id. § 633. The court will establish "permissible terms and condition" which the parent
or other person legally responsible for the child must follow during the period of suspended
judgment. Id. The initial one year period may be extended upon a judicial finding of excep-
tional circumstances. Id.
100. Id. § 634. The court may order this commitment subject to any conditions it deems
proper. Id.
101. Id. § 631. See, e.g., In re Clear, 65 Misc.2d 323, 318 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Fam. Ct. 1970);
In re Stephen B, 60 Misc.2d 662, 303 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Fam. Ct: 1969).
102. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 631 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
103. Id. § 651.
104. In re Giliberto, 4 App. Div. 2d 692, 163 N.Y.S. 2d 802 (4th Dep't 1957), aff'd, 3
N.Y.2d 915, 145 N.E.2d 874, 167 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1957).
105. 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976).
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efforts to regain custody of her child could only be thwarted by the
mother's surrender or abandoment of the child; persistent neglect
by the mother; the mother's unfitness; "or other like extraordinary
circumstances" such as prolonged separation of the mother from the
child, combined with the mother's lack of an established household
of her own, her unwed state, and an attachment of the child to the
custodial foster parent.
Thus, when the natural parent requests the return of the child
from a foster parent, it is not simply a contest as to which would
make the better parent. Absent extraordinary circumstances, if the
natural parent can show he or she is a fit parent and did not aban-
don or neglect the child, then the court will award custody of the
child to the natural parent even if the foster parents could provide
a better home. 06
The two questions which the court must consider in a habeas
corpus proceeding are: 07
(1) Are there "extradornary circumstances" within the Bennett
guidelines which vitiate the natural parent's ordinarily paramount
right to custody?
(2) If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, what are
the "best interests" of the child?
In such a proceeding, the agency, through the caseworker assigned
to the child, will be called upon not so much to distinguish between
which is the better home, but to state whether the natural parent
is a fit parent.' 8 Given this pivotal role, the agency is charged with
investigating any extraordinary circumstances and protecting the
best interests of the child. At a minimum, this would seem to re-
quire '09 first-hand knowledge of the parties; an in-depth study or
personal observation of either the foster parents' or natural parents'
home status; a review of the child's best interests; a physical and
psychological examination of the natural parents, where indicated;
an interview of the foster parents, the natural parents, the child and
any physicians or caseworkers assigned to the case; and an in-depth
study of the child in his or her relations with the natural parents
and foster parents.
106. Id. at 549, 356 N.E.2d at 283, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
107. In re Spence-Chapin Svce., N.Y.L.J., Oct. 24, 1977 p. 11, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
108. Id.
109. Id. at p. 12, col. 2-3.
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The court makes its determination based on a fair preponderance
of the credible evidence submitted at the hearing. It may reserve
decision or announce the determination immediately; in any event,
the court must announce the basis for its determination.
III. Applicable Standards After Bennett v. Jeffreys
Since the early 1970's greater emphasis has been placed upon the
best interest of the foster child in his own well-being. This emphasis
has included newly-enacted legislation aimed at protecting a child
in foster care and assuring his future well-being by removing bar-
riers to the termination of parental rights and freeing the child for
adoption. For example, in 1971 the legislature enacted section 392
of the Social Service Law"" which for the first time mandated that
the family court review the status of every child in foster care at
least every twenty-four months. As a result of these review hearings,
the family court has been successful in freeing many children for
adoftion, or in appropriate cases, returning children to their natural
parents.
In 1976, the New York State Court of Appeals decided three cases
which have made it easier for agencies to free foster children for
adoption. All emphasized the "best interests of the child" as the
controlling principle in child custody cases. The first, In re
Anonymous,"' held that an agency which applies for guardianship
can prove abandonment, without also proving its own diligent ef-
forts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship; the
second case, In re Orlando F.,"12 held that parental failure to plan
adequately for the future of a child in agency custody is sufficient
to support a determination of permanent neglect; the third case,
Bennett v. Jeffreys, "' established the "best interests of the child"
principle as the standard controlling parental rights to custody.
Prior to this series of cases, it had been settled case law that
abandonment arose only from a complete repudiation of parent-
hood" 4 or from "a settled purpose to be rid of all parental obliga-
tions, and to forego all parental rights.""' 5 The court has progressed
110. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 392 (McKinney 1971).
111. 40 N.Y.2d 96, 351 N.E.2d 707 386 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1976).
112. 40 N.Y.2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 711, 386 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1976).
113. 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976).
114. In re Maxwell, 4 N.Y.2d 429 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958).
115. Id., at 433, 151 N.E.2d at 850, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 283. See also, Spence-Chapin Adop-
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a long way since its pronouncement that even where "the flame of
parental interests was reduced to a flicker, the courts may not pro-
perly intervene to dissolve the parentage." ' 6 Rather than jealously
guarding the natural parent's right to his child, the court recently
has recognized that parental rights may be terminated even without
fault on the part of the natural parent, on the principle that it is in
"the best interests of the child" to do so. '17
In establishing standards in the determination of the custody of
children, the courts must look to the landmark case of Bennett v.
Jeffreys. "I In Bennett, the court enunciated the principle that the
state may deprive the natural parent of custody of his child when
that parent has either surrendered, abandoned or permanently neg-
lected the child; where he has been found to be unfit; or where
extraordinary circumstances exist. This last basis for loss of custody
was espoused formally for the first time in Bennett. The court found
extraordinary circumstances existed in that: (1) there was a pro-
longed separation between mother and child; (2) the mother lacked
an established household; (3) the mother was unwed; and (4) the
child was attached psychologically to the non-parent custodian. The
court held that these extraordinary circumstances "trigger[ed] the
'best interests of the child' test.""' Thus, once the court finds ex-
traordinary circumstances, the natural parent may lose custody of
the child without any unfitness or fault on his part, since disposition
of custody is now controlled by the best interests of the child.
However, the Bennett case involved only physical custody of the
infant, and not legal custody or the termination of parental rights.
Still, the principles enunciated have had wide-reaching effect, and
have been cited in almost all types of cases relating to the physical
tion Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 274 N.E.2d 431, 324 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1971); People ex rel.
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 10 N.Y.2d 332, 179 N.E.2d 200, 222 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1968).
Neither Anonymous, Orlando F. or Bennett specifically overruled Maxwell or Polk. This
was done by section 384(6) of the New York Social Service Law (added 1975 N.Y. Laws, ch.
704, § 1, repealed 1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 666, § 2). See, e.g., In re Goldman, 41 N.Y.2d 894,
362 N.E.2d 619, 393 N.Y.S.2d 989, aff"g, 51 App. Div. 2d 282,381 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1st Dep't 1976.
See also, note 116 infra.
116. In re Susan W., 34 N.Y.2d 76, 80, 312 N.E.2d 171, 174, 356 N.Y.S.2d 34, 38 (1974).
Contra: In re Amy S., 89 Misc. 2d 42, 390 N.Y.S.2d 530 (Fain. Ct. 1977) holding that the
"flicker of interest" rule is no longer applicable.
117. In re Sanjivini K., 40 N.Y.2d 1025, 359 N.E.2d 1330, 391 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1976).
118. 40 NY.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S. 2d 821 (1976).
119. 40 N.Y.2d at 548, 356 N.E.2d at 283, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
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or legal custody of the infant. In this regard, Bennett has to some
extent contributed to the confusion in custody proceedings. Most of
the confusion centers around the fact-finding hearing in permanent
neglect proceedings brought under section 384(b) of the Social Serv-
ice Law. 20 The question is whether the Bennett principles apply to
permanent neglect and abandonment proceedings in which the nat-
ural parent may lose both physical and legal custody (i. e., all rights
and obligations toward the child).
While most courts readily have cited the "best interests of the
child" principle as the basis for determining custody, it is apparent
that the citation has been at best no more than an acknowledgement
of stare decisis, and at worst a means by which the courts have given
themselves free rein in establishing their own ad hoc guidelines. The
resultant confusion may be illustrated best by the recent case of In
re Sanjivini K. 2
In Sanjivini, the Department of Social Services instituted a "392
hearing" to review the foster care status of the illigitimate child of
an Indian alien. The mother who was in the United States on a
student visa, voluntarily placed the child in temporary foster care
with the department three weeks after her birth in 1966. Since 1968
the child had been in a foster home.'22 During the course of the
child's foster care, the mother's visa expired and she faced deporta-
tion. A 1968 proceeding bought by the agency declared the child
permanently neglected, and the agency succeeded in extending
placement, although this was apparently only a sham administra-
tive step to forestall deportation.2 3 Thereafter, the placement was
extended periodically. A 1974 family court order was appealed by
the mother, but was dismissed for failure to prosecute. In February,
1975, the family court, after a "392 hearing", found that the best
interest of the child required that her permanent status be ascer-
tained as soon as possible, and directed the prompt institution of a
120. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384(b) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
121. 53 App. Div. 2d 863, 385 N.Y.S.2d 350 (2d Dep't 1976), rev'd, 40 N.Y.2d 1025, 359
N.E.2d 1330, 391 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1976).
122. "It is quite clear that the environment in that home is warm, constructive, and
wholesome, that Sandy has been happy and is thriving there, and that she would even like
to be adopted by the foster parents." 53 App. Div. 2d at 864, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
123. "The order expressly stated ... that, 'the Court has no finding concerning any acts
of the mother that might have constituted a neglect. Therefore, that matter is not determined
at all." 53 App. Div. 2d at 865, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
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proceeding to free her for adoption. The mother .appealed.
While the appeal of the family court's order was before the appel-
late division, a second independent permanent neglect proceeding
in the family court declared the child permanently neglected.
The appellate division unanimously reversed the family court's
order directing that the child be freed for-adoption, and directed
that the child be returned to the mother immediately. Recognizing
that "[t]he determination of whether the foster care should have
been continued hinged upon whether it was 'in accordance with the
best interests of the child,' "12 the appellate court said:
The record certainly does not establish that [the mother] abandoned her
child or is an unfit mother. To the contrary, under the most trying circum-
stances, [she] manifested qualities of courage, industry, pesistence, and
intelligence, and those characteristics cannot be turned against her to indefi-
nitely deprive her of her child. Under all the circumstances herein, it is in
accordance with the best interests of the child that she be returned to, her
natural mother."'
The appellate division decision was handed down in July, 1976,
after Bennett v. Jeffreys had been argued, but before it had been
decided by the court of appeals. 'The appellate division relied on
the historic New York view that "[tihe reasons f6r denying a
mother's claim to custody must be weighty. and compelling."t"
The court of appeals reversed the appellate division and rein-
stated the family court order, stating, "What is paramount . . . is
the proper resolution of the interests of a young girl, her natural
mother and her foster parents . . . [which] will best be served by
resolving the status of the child and the rights and obligations of the
parties in conformity with the [Bennett] standards . "27
While this language may be read as equating the interests of the
child with those of the natural parents and the foster parent, it is
apparent that any conflicting interest must be resolved in the
child's favor. This the appellate division failed to do, notwithstand-
ing the language in its opinion that its resolution was "in accordance
with the best interests of the child."'2'
124. Id. at 864, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 351. . .
125. Id., at 865, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
126. Id., at 866, 385 N.Y.S.2d at.353.
127. 40 N.Y.2d at 1026, 359 N.E.2d at 1331, 391 N.Y.S:2d at'537. .
128. 53 App. Div. at 865, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
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Thus, Sanjivini holds that the "best interests of the child" princi-
ple applies to a permanent neglect proceeding and, therefore, a
natural parent now may lose legal custody of a child without a court
finding of neglect. Moreover, as Judge Gabrielli's dissent in
Sanjivini suggests, such a termination even may be made despite
an affirmat ive finding that the natural parent had not been neglect-
ful.'2 9
The court, then, has created a "no-fault" appendage to the legis-
lative standards for terminating parental custody rights, which has
both complicated and confused child custody proceedings by blur-
ring the distinction between the fact-finding hearing and the dispo-
sitional hearing. The result is a series of family court cases which
have gone far beyond the legislative mandate.
In re Amy S. 130 involved an abandonment proceeding in which the
authorized agency sought to free the child for adoption. In remand-
ing the case for a new fact-finding hearing, Judge W. Denis Donovan
said;
[Ilt appears to this Court that the Court of Appeals in Matter of Bennett
v. Jeffreys may have added a new and independent basis for termination of
parental rights by its definition of "extraordinary circumstances". It now
appears to this Court that under the criteria enunciated in Matter of Bennett
v. Jeffreys prolonged separation of the natural parent and child, particularly
a separation which commences in early childhood, mandates a consideration
of the best interests of the Child. Such consideration ... may then be found
to require sustaining the psychological parentage which has formed between
the child and the foster parents by freeing the child for adoption .... By
inference, therefore, the requirement of finding omission to act without good
reason ... may be rendered inoperative.... .
In short, it may well be the present state of the law that termination of
the parental rights of the natural mother may in the .proper circumstances
solely be a sequel of a'finding that it is in the best interests of the child to
remain within the psychological parentage in which the child developed with
the termination of the natural mother's rights requiring no independent basis
of fact-finding., .
Thus, Amy S. holds that in an abandonment proceeding, a parent
may lose legal custody of his child even though the parent had good
reason for not visiting the child. This is no-fault termination of
parental rights to the child.
129. 40 N.Y.2d at 1027, 359 N.E.2d at 1334, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 540 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
130. 89 Misc. 2d 42, 390 N.Y.S.2d 530 (Fam. Ct. 1976).
131. 89 Misc. 2d at 49-50, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 535-36.
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In In re Patricia Ann, 3 Judge Stanley Gartenstein interpreted
the Bennett test to apply to the fact-finding hearing in permanent
neglect cases. Judge Gartenstein stated:
We hold therefore that the import of Bennett v. Jeffreys is to mandate a
limited consideration of the best interests of the child at the fact-finding
stage and that the line of demarcation between the two separate hearings
contemplated by FCA section 622 and section 623 has been judicially erased,
to an extent yet to be determined by appellate hearings. At this stage, lacking
any other guide, we hold that any consideration of the child's best interests
at the fact-finding hearing over and above that permitted herein would in-
fringe upon the statutory scheme contemplating a separate dispositional
hearing. We are still of necessity, unsure of the ultimate effect this line of
authority will have on the statutory privilege against consideration of disposi-
tional matter as contained in FCA, section 625, but we prognosticate that
with such changes effectuated in the statutory scheme, appellate authority
should be forthcoming relatively quickly as a result of clarifying litigation.,"
As indicated in Patricia Ann, it is not now certain to what extent,
if at all, the best interests of the child test should invade the fact-
finding hearing.
In In re "Male" Chiang,3' Judge Shirley Kram dismissed an
agency petition after a fact-finding hearing, butheld that the best
interests of the child test is applicable to a permanent neglect pro-
ceeding at the fact-finding stage where extraordinary circumstances
exist, stating:
Ultimately, the Court must consider the issues in the light of what is best
for the child, Chiang. The prolonged separation from his natural mother is
the extraordinary circumstance which triggers a thorough consideration by
this Court of the best interests of the child.'3
Since Bennett, Orlando F., and Sanjivini were decided by the
court of appeals before the effective date of the new comprehensive
foster case law, including section 384(b) of the Social Service Law,'
it is no longer certain whether the "best interests of the child" test
is relevant to the fact-finding hearing, and, if it is, to what extent
it is relevant.
132. 89 Misc. 2d 368, 392 N.Y.S.2d 180 (Farn. Ct. 1977).
133. Id. at 377, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
134. N.Y.L.J., June 30, 1977, p. 13, col. 2 (Fam. Ct. 1977).
135. Id.
136. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-b (McKinney Supp. 1977).
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Since section 384(b)(7)(a)'37 has been taken substantially from
section 611 of the Family Court Act,' the principles enunciated in
Bennett, Orlando F., and Sanjivini should still apply. Based upon
these cases, the "best interest of the child" test should be considered
at the fact-finding hearing; thus, a parent may lose legal custody of
the child without a finding of unfitness or fault. Furthermore, every
aspect of the natural parents' and foster parents' background and
custodial qualifications would have to be reviewed at the fact-
finding hearing, together with a review of the needs and interests of
the child.
As a result of the present state of confusion in child custody
proceedings, it is possible for an agency or foster parent to be suc-
cessful in freeing a child for adoption depending solely on which
judge is sitting. For example, some judges apply the Bennett princi-
ples to their full extent in permanent neglect fact-finding hear-
ings.'39 The result is that, when extraordinary circumstances exist,
the court can find permanent neglect without a finding of fault or
unfitness of the natural parent, and without determining whether
the agency had used diligent efforts to work with the parent for the
child's return.'40 Other judges refuse to apply Bennett at the fact-
finding hearing, and do not permit any evidence concerning the best
interests of the child. They are concerned only with the failure of
the parent to plan for the future of the child, or to have substantial
contact with the child during foster care, and with the diligent
efforts of the agency to promote the parental relationship. Still other
judges apply Bennett to a limited extent at the fact-finding hear-
ing."'
The result of these variances is confusion and uncertainty among
the courts, attorneys, child-care agencies, parents and children, in
an atmosphere which encourages forum-shopping and breeds loss of
confidence in the legislature and the courts.
137. Id. § 384-b(7)(a).
138. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 611 (McKinney 1971).
139. See, e.g., In re Ray, 90 Misc. 2d 35, 393 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Fan. Ct. 1977).
140. See, e.g., In re Suzanne Y. 92 Misc. 2d 652, 401'N.Y.S.2d 529 (Fam. Ct. 1978), in
which the court held that "no fault" termination of parental rights was warranted, despite
the complete absence of statutory grounds for the termination, since it was in the best interest
of the child.
141. See, e.g., In re Patricia Ann, 89 Misc. 2d 368, 392 N.Y.S.2d 180 (Farn. Ct. 1977), in
which Judge Stanley Gartenstein permitted testimony concerning the best interests of the
child in the fact-finding hearing of a permanent neglect proceeding, to a "limited" extent.
19781
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
IV. The Role Of The Social Worker As A Witness In Child
Custody Proceedings
A. Preparation
When a social worker is called in any of the proceedings discussed
in section II, he must be fully prepared to give clear and convincing
testimony. Nothing can take the place of thorough preparation be-
fore the hearing. It is essential that the caseworker and agency attor-
ney meet prior to the hearing and prepare for both direct and cross-
examination. Prior to the meeting with the attorney it is important
for the worker to review the case record thoroughly.
After the caseworker has reviewed the case, he and the case super-
visor should meet with the attorney to prepare their presentation.
The preliminary preparation should include the following informa-
tion:
(1) Name and date of birth of each child.
(2) Date of placement for each child, and the reason for the
placement.
(3) The circumstances for placement (abuse, neglect, abandon-
ment, court order, etc.).
(4) Was the child placed directly with the agency, or with a
foster home?
(5) What emotional or medical problems, if any, did the child
have when he initially came into foster care?
(6) How did the child adjust to the institution?
(7) While the child was at the institution, were any psychiatric,
psychological, neurological or E.E.G. examinations administered?
What were the results and follow-up of each?
(8) Did the child go to a foster home? Give the dates, names of
foster parents, and number of foster homes in which the child has
been placed. What were the adjustments in the foster home?
(9) What school did the child attend? What were the dates and
reasons for transfers, if any? How did the child adjust to school?
Give the child's grades at each school and correlation with type of
placement.
(10) While the child was placed in the foster home, were any
psychiatric, psychological or neurological examinations
administered? What were the results and follow-up of each?
(11) Did the natural parents visit the child during placement?
How often? Were these visits initiated by the agency or the natural
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parents? How did the child respond before, during and after these
visits?
(12) Were letters sent to the natural parents? How often? Are
there copies of these letters? Were they acknowledged by the
parents?
(13) Were there meaningful contacts with the natural family?
Were the natural parents interviewed? In testifying about agency
contacts with the natural parents, the caseworker should know: (a)
dates of all contacts, including all visitation letters written to the
family, and all contact dates made prior to the interview; (b) an
evaluation of the interview; (c) assistance offered and follow-up by
the agency; (d) efforts made by the agency to encourage and
strengthen the parental relationship; (e) physical and mental exam-
inations of the parents, if any; (f) the dates and outcome of any staff
conferences, including any recommendations.
(14) How many contacts has the worker had with the child?
What other contacts, interviews and examinations has the agency
had with the child? What are the agency's goals for the child? What
efforts have been made by the agency in meeting these goals?
(15) Who are the foster parents? What were the circumstances
of placement with the foster parents? How old are they? Are there
any natural children living at home with the foster parents? What
is the relationship among the foster parents, any natural children
and the foster child? What kind of family activity do they partici-
pate in? What are the general living conditions in the foster home?
What kind of discipline do the foster parents utilize with their own
children and with the foster child?
(16) Can the worker, if qualified, give an opinion as to the
child's best interests? For example, if a termination proceeding,
should the child be freed for adoption?
B. Testimony
Because of frequent turnovers in the foster care field, the case-
worker who will be testifying at the hearing often will not have
complete personal knowledge of all the facts. These facts, however,
are recorded in the case record. Therefore, it is important to have
the child's entire case record admitted into evidence since it is the
best evidence of the child's history.
The introduction of case records should precede the caseworker's
testimony. The case supervisor should identify the case records and
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testify that: (1) it is the regular course of the agency's business to
keep records; (2) the case records of the child in this proceeding were
made in the regular course of business; (3) the entries contained in
the case records were made contemporaneously with the events de-
scribed therein; and (4) the records were kept under the supervision
and control of the supervisor.
With this foundation laid, the entire case record can be admitted
in evidence, and the caseworker can testify from the records con-
cerning events that he did not observe, or which occurred prior to
his employment. In addition to the case records, the caseworker may
use notes to refresh his memory.
C. Testimony at the hearing
The attorney for the agency usually will call two witnesses: the
case supervisor and the caseworker. Usually the supervisor will not
be personally familiar with the case, having had less contact with
the parties than the caseworker.
The case records will be placed in evidence after a proper founda-
tion has been laid, and the case supervisor can testify from the
records, subject to cross-examination by the attorney for the natural
parents and the Law Guardian. A case supervisor can be qualified
as an expert and may then give his opinion on the best interests of
the child. Generally, the case supervisor will testify that it is the
best interests of the child to be freed for adoption. He will also
testify that the agency was diligent in attempting to encourage and
strengthen the parental ties, but despite the agency's best efforts,
the parent neglected either to visit or to plan for the child's return.
The caseworker for the natural parents will testify that he was
assigned to work with the natural parents with the ultimate goal of
reuniting parent and child. He will outline all the attempts made
to encourage and strengthen the parental ties, such as mailing regu-
lar visitation notices to the mother, making monthly home visits,
encouraging the parent to visit the child, and if necessary, supplying
the natural parents with carfare to visit the child or bringing the
child to the parents' home. The caseworker should be able to testify
that he assisted in other ways, such as aiding the parents in receiv-
ing public assistance, enrolling in a drug or alcohol treatment pro-
gram or obtaining employment or larger living quarters. If the case-
worker cannot show diligent effort to strengthen and encourage the
parental relationship, he must be prepared to testify that it would
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have been detrimental to the interests of the child to do so. For
example, if the parent abused the child during the initial visits, or
the child had nightmares after each visit, the agency would be justi-
fied in not continuing to strengthen the parental ties.
The caseworker assigned to the foster family and the child, if
different from the worker assigned to the natural family, will also
be called. He will testify to the type of care the child receives at the
foster home, to the physical condition of the child and to the prog-
ress he has made since being placed with the foster family. When
indicated, the agency psychiatrist or psychologist who examined the
child may testify that it would have been detrimental to the moral
and temporal welfare of the child to encourage or strengthen the
parental relationship.
The attorney for the natural parents will attempt to show that the
caseworker did not make diligent efforts to encourage and
strengthen the parental relationship, but instead favored the foster
parents over the natural parents. The parents may testify that the
agency caseworker talked only of freeing the child for adoption and
did little or nothing to aid the natural parents, or that they did not
plan for the return of the child because they were financially unable
to do so. There may have been a period when a parent was out of
work and public assistance payments were insufficient. The natural
mother may testify that she could not visit or plan for the child
because of some physical problem or hospitalization.
Because of the adversarial nature of all child custody proceedings,
the testimony of the caseworker is extremely important. It is only
through meticulous preparation and close cooperation among the
agency, the caseworker and the attorney that a fair and accurate
representation of the child's history can be presented to aid the
count in its determination.
V. Conclusion
It is incumbent on the legislature to amend section 614 of the
Family Court Act, and section 384(b) of the Social Services Law to
state clearly whether the "best interest of the child" test has any
relevancy at the fact-finding stage, or whether there must be an
independent finding at the fact-finding hearing of neglect or fault
on the part of the parent before the "best interest of the child" test
is applied at the dispositional hearing.
The weight of authority suggests that the best interests of the
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child must be a factor at all stages of a child-custody proceeding,
including the fact-finding hearing, when extraordinary circumstan-
ces exist. However, the legislature must give the judiciary guidance
in determining the "extraordinary circumstances" which trigger the
best interest test. At the least, a presumption of extraordinary cir-
cumstances should exist when the child has been in a foster home
for a continuous period of two years.
Finally, the legislature must define "best interest of the child" to
put an end to the uncertainty and inconsistency which pervade
current child custody proceedings.
At a minimum, the test should consider the following elements:
1. the length of custody by the foster parents.
2. the possible psychological trauma to the child if he were to
be removed from the foster home.
3. the present environment and living conditions of the foster
parents and the natural parent.
4. the qualifications of the foster parents and the natural parent.
5. the background and circumstances of the foster parents and
the natural parent.
6. the religious affiliation of the foster parents and that of the
child and natural parent.
7. the race of the foster parents and that of the child.
8. the probability of eventual adoption by the foster parents as
opposed to potential reunion with the natural parent.
In enacting such reforms and tightening the overbroad legislative
mandate, the legislature would give much-needed guidance to the
courts and the child-caring agencies, and contribute to the best
interests of the children in their care.
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